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Abstract 
Possibilistic logic, an extension of first-order 
logic, deals with uncertainty that can be es­
timated in terms of possibility and necessity 
measures. Syntactically, this means that a 
first-order formula is equipped with a possi­
bility degree or a necessity degree that ex­
presses to what extent the formula is pos­
sibly or necessarily true. Possibilistic reso­
lution yields a calculus for possibilistic logic 
which respects the semantics developed for 
possibilistic logic. 
A drawback, which possibilistic resolution in­
herits from classical resolution, is that it may 
not terminate if applied to formulas belong­
ing to decidable fragments of first-order log­
ic. Therefore we propose an alternative proof 
method for possibilistic logic. The main fea­
ture of this method is that it completely ab­
stracts from a concrete calculus but uses as 
basic operation a test for classical entailment. 
We then instantiate possibilistic logic with 
a terminological logic, which is a decidable 
subclass of first-order logic but nevertheless 
much more expressive than propositional log­
ic. This yields an extension of terminological 
logics towards the representation of uncer­
tain knowledge which is satisfactory from a 
semantic as well as algorithmic point of view. 
1 Introduction 
There have been many proposals for the treatment of 
uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, in particular for 
expert systems and knowledge representation systems 
(for an overview see, e .g. , [17, 14]). If uncertainty can 
be estimated in terms of possibility and necessity mea­
sures (as used in the framework of possibility theory 
[22]) possibilistic logic is a promising candidate. In 
fact, a basic feature of possibilistic logic is its abil­
ity to model states of knowledge ranging from com­
plete information to total ignorance by expressing low­
er bounds for the possibility or necessity of some piece 
of knowledge. This allows, for instance, to distinguish 
between the total lack of certainty in the truth of a 
proposition and the certainty that the proposition is 
false. 
From a syntactical point of view, possibilistic logic em­
ploys closed first-order formulas which are equipped 
with a possibility degree or a necessity degree: A 
weight ITa (resp. N a) attached to a formula p models 
to what extent p is possibly (resp. necessarily) true, 
where a ranges between 0 and 1. To express, for ex­
ample, that p is likely to be true one may use the 
necessity-valued formula (p, N0.7), whereas one may 
write (p, 110.9} to model that p is to a high degree 
possible, but not certain at all .  
Recently, a semantics for possibilistic logic has been 
presented for the general case where possibility- as well 
as necessity-valued formulas are allowed ( cf. [15]). The 
semantics is based on fuzzy sets of interpretations, i.e., 
with each classical interpretation w of the language as­
sociated with the first-order formulas occurring in a set 
of possibilistic formulas a value 7r(w) between 0 and 1 
is assigned. The possibility and necessity of a formu­
la pis then given by II(p) = sup{7r(w) I w f= p} and 
N(p) = 1 -Il(•p). A fuzzy set of interpretations sat­
isfies a possibilistic formula (p, Ila) (resp. (p, Ncr)) 
iff II(p) � a (resp. N(p) � a). Entailment is then 
straightforwardly defined as follows : A possibilistic 
formula 4; is a logical consequence of a possibilistic 
knowledge base 41, i.e., a set of possibilistic formulas, 
iff every fuzzy set of interpretations satisfying each el­
ement in Ill also satisfies ¢. 
The entailment of a possibilistic formula from a pos­
sibilistic knowledge base can be checked mechanically 
on the basis of possibilistic resolution-an extension 
of the well-known resolution principle to possibilistic 
logic-which ha.s been introduced in [8] . If applications 
of the possibilistic resolution rule to Ill U {(...,p, N1)} 
yield a derivation of an empty possibilistic clause (D, v) 
then Ill entails (p, v) , where v is either II a or N a for 
some a E [0, 1]. 
A drawback, which possibilistic resolution inherits 
from classical resolution, is that it may not termi­
nate if applied to formulas belonging to decidable frag-
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ments of first-order logic. In fact, if the input formu­
las contain existential quantifiers in the scope of uni­
versal quantifiers, the (Skolem) function symbols that 
result from transforming these formulas into clause 
form may cause non-termination of standard resolu­
tion (and thus possibilistic resolution) .1 Moreover, 
the transformation of possibilistic formulas into clause 
form yields another problem: A set of possibility­
valued formulas cannot always be transformed into an 
"equivalent" set of clauses-not even for the proposi­
tional case (cf. [15], Section 3.1). 
For these reasons we propose an alternative proof 
method for possibilistic logic. The main feature of this 
method is that it completely abstracts from a concrete 
calculus (such as the resolution or tableaux calculus), 
and instead uses as basic operation a test for classical 
entailment. If this test is effective for a given fragment 
of first-order logic, we show that possibilistic reasoning 
is also decidable for this fragment. Additionally, if one 
has an algorithm that solves the entailment problem, 
our proof method automatically yields an algorithm 
realizing possibilistic entailment. We prove that the 
proposed method is sound and complete (for the gen­
eral case where both possibility- and necessity-valued 
formulas are allowed) with respect to the semantics of 
possibilistic logic. 
We then show how our method can be utilized to ob­
tain decision procedures for a possibilistic extension of 
terminological knowledge representation formalisms, 
also called terminological logics. These formalisms, 
which are employed in terminological representation 
systems such as BACK [18), CLASSIC (5), KRIS (3], or 
LOOM [16) are in general decidable fragments of first­
order logic, but are nevertheless expressive enough to 
define the relevant concepts of a problem domain. This 
is done by building complex concepts from primitive 
concepts (unary predicates) and roles (binary pred­
icates) with the help of operations provided by the 
concept language of the particular formalism. For ex­
ample, if we assume that person and car are concepts 
and that owns is a role, the concept personn3owns.car 
describes the set of all persons having some car. Ad­
ditionally, objects (or individuals) can be introduced 
by stating that an object is instance of a concept (e.g., 
Tom : person), or that two objects are related by a role 
(e.g., (Tom, car _7): owns). 
Several approaches have already been proposed to en­
hance the expressivity of terminological formalisms 
with (some form of) uncertainty (e.g., probabilistic 
implications between concepts (lOJ or subsumption be­
tween fuzzy concepts [20]). The approach that comes 
nearest to ours, is described in [21). It outlines an 
architecture for incorporating approximate reasoning 
1 It should be noted that the resolution calculus can be 
modified such that it yields decision procedures for vari­
ous decidable fragments of first-order logic (see e.g. [19]). 
However, it is not yet clear whether or not this approach 
can be extended to the possibilistic case. 
into terminological systems. The main problem of this 
approach, however, is that its behavior is only de­
scribed informally, i.e., neither a complete semantics 
nor algorithms for the main inference problems are 
given. 
An extension of terminological formalisms towards the 
representation of uncertain knowledge which is satis­
factory both from a semantic and algorithmic point of 
view can be obtained by instantiating possibilistic log­
ic with a terminological logic. This means that we do 
not allow arbitrary first-order formulas in possibilistic 
formulas, but only those which can be formed by a par­
ticular terminological formalism. To be more precise, 
in the possibilistic extension we present one can, on 
the one hand, state plausible rules between concepts. 
For example, the rule 
(person n rich -t 3owns.Porsche, II0.7), 
expresses that "rich persons are likely to own a 
Porsche." Of course, universally valid rules, i.e., strict 
implications between concepts such as "every Porsche 
is car" can be formulated by using the maximal ne­
cessity value N 1. On the other hand, one can express 
uncertain knowledge concerning particular objects by 
adding possibility or necessity values to formulas ex­
pressing concept and role instanceships. 
This approach has not only the advantage of being 
semantically sound. It also provides one with deci­
sion procedures for the basic inference problems (e.g., 
possibilistic entailment) which are sound and com­
plete with respect to the semantics for possibilistic 
logic. These decision procedures can immediately be 
obtained by instantiating our proof method with in­
ference algorithms for terminological logics as, for ex­
ample , described in (6, 2]. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we 
introduce syntax and semantics of possibilistic log­
ic. The alternative proof method and the proof of its 
soundness and completeness are given in Section 3. Fi­
nally, in Section 4, we propose a possibilistic extension 
of terminological logics. 
2 Possibilistic Logic 
This section reviews possibilistic logic. 2 We start with 
introducing the syntax for possibilistic formulas, and 
then we recapitulate the semantics for possibilistic log­
ic as defined in [15). Finally, possibilistic resolution, a 
proof calculus for possibilistic logic, is presented. 
A possibilistic formula is either a pair (p, Ih) or (p, Na) 
where pis a closed first-order formula and a E [0, 1] is 
a real number. A finite set of possibilistic formulas is 
called a possibilistic knowledge base. 
Intuitively, a possibility-valued formula (p, ITa) (resp. 
necessity-valued formula (p, N a)) expresses that p is 
possibly (resp. necessarily) true at least to degree a .  
2For a more thorough introduction consult [7]. 
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Let 0 be the set of interpretations of a first-order lan­
guage. A possibility distribution 1r on 0 is a mapping 
from 0 to (0, 1] such that 1r(w) = 1 for some w E n. 
Note that the normalization requirement, i.e., 1r(w) = 
1 for some w E SJ, guarantees that there is at least one 
world which could be considered the real one. Every 
possibility distribution 1r on n induces two functions, 
denoted by II' and N', mapping elements of 
i ={pI (p, Na) E � or (p, IIa) E �} 
to [0, 1]. These functions, called possibility measure 
and necessity measure, are defined as follows. 
Let 1r be a possibility distribution on a set 0 of inter­
pretations. The functions II' and N' defined by 
• II'(p) = sup{7r(w) I w E n  and w F p} 
• N'(p) = inf{l- 7r(w) I w E n  and w � p} 
are called possibility measure and necessity measure, 
where sup{} := 0 and inf{} := 1. 
A direct consequence of the definition is IT' (p V q) = 
max{IT'(p), II'(q)} and IT'(pl\q):::; min{IT'(p), II'(q)}, 
which in fact shows that the possibility measure is in 
accordance with the basic axioms of possibility the­
ory ( cf. (22]). Moreover, by duality of the measures 
IT' and N', i.e., IT'(p) = 1- N'(..,p), we have for the 
necessity measure N'(p 1\ q) = min{N'(p), N'(q)} and 
N'(p V q) � max{N'(p), N'(q)}. If a (first-order) for­
mula p--+ q is valid, i.e. {p} I= q, it is easy to ver­
ify that IT'(p) :::; IT'(q) and N'(p) :::; N'(q); further­
more IT'(T) = N'(T) = 1 for any tautology T, and 
II'(l.) = N'(l.) = 0 for any inconsistent formula l.. 
In possibilistic logic, the notions of satisfaction and 
entailment are defined with respect to possibility dis­
tributions. 
A possibility distribution 1r on a set n of interpreta­
tions satisfies a possibilistic formula (p, ITa), written 
as 1r F (p, ITa), iff ll'(p) �a, and it satisfies (p, Na), 
written as 1r F (p, N a ) , iff N'(p) � a. A possibility 
disttibution 1r on n satisfies a possibilistic knowledge 
base � iff 1r f= ¢ for all ¢ E �. Finally, we say that 
a possibilistic formula ¢ is entailed by a possibilistic 
knowledge base�. denoted by � F ¢, iff 1r f= ifJ for all 
1r such that 1r F � holds. 
Let us consider an example. Consider the possibilistic 
knowledge base 
.P = {(p, N0.8), (p--? q, N0.4), (q-+ r, ll0.7)}. 
Then � entails the formula (r, IT0.7). To see this, 
let 1r be a possibility distribution satisfying ci>. We 
first observe that 1r f=: (q, N 0.4). In fact, since 
{p,p --+ q} F q we conclude N'(q) � N'(p 1\ (p --+ 
q)) = min{N'(p), N'(p -+ q)} � 0.4. Duality gives 
us IT'(...,q) :::; 0.6. Furthermore, note that 0.7 :::; 
II'(q-+ r) = IT'(...,q V r) =max {ll'(--.q), II'(r)}. Since 
IT'(-.q) :::; 0.6 we can conclude that IT'(r) � 0.7. This 
shows that 1r satisfies (r, ll0.7). 
There are possibilistic knowledge bases which are not 
satisfied by any possibilistic distribution. For exam­
ple, if � contains both (p, N 0.7) and (...,p, N 0.4), 
one gets TI'(--.p) = sup{rr(w) I w F ...,p} $ 0.3 and 
IT'(p) = sup{1r(w) I w I= p}:::; 0.6 for every possibility 
distribution 1r. But this means that 1r(w) :::; 0.6 for 
every w, which shows that the normalization require­
ment, i.e., 1r(w) = 1 for some w, is not satisfied. Thus 
� cannot be satisfied by any possibilistic distribution. 
This, of course, means that every possibilistic formula 
is entailed by �. However, the fact that we have more 
confidence in the truth of p than in the truth of ...,p is 
not taken into account by the semantics just described. 
To achieve this behavior, i.e., to block the entailment 
of a possibilistic formula from an "inconsistent" knowl­
edge base, we need the notion of an absurd interpreta­
tion. To define this notion, we (temporarily) view an 
interpretation w as a function that maps a first-order 
formula p to an element of the set {0, 1} such that 
w(p) = 1 if w != p and w(p) = 0 ifw � p. 
The function that maps each formula p to 1 is called 
the absurd interpretation and is denoted by w l., i.e., 
w 1. (p) = 1 for all formulas p. By abuse of notation, in 
the following we simply write WJ. F p if£ WJ. (p) = L 
Let 0 be a set of (classical) interpretations and let wl. 
be the absurd interpretation. A possibility distribu­
tion is now a mapping from ol. := n u {wl.} to [0, 1] 
such that 1r(w) = 1 for some w E n.L. The possibili­
ty measure IT and necessity measure N induced by a 
possibility distribution 1r on nl. is defined by 
• IT(p) = sup{rr(w) I wE 01. and w F= p} and 
• N(p) = inf{l- rr(w) I w E  fh and wit= p}. 
Observe that II(p) = max{IT'(p), 1r(wl.)} and N(p) = 
N'(p), which means that the duality between II and N 
can be expressed by IT(p) � max{1- N(...,p), 1r(wl.)}. 
Furthermore, it can easily be verified that the thus 
defined possibility and necessity measures satisfy the 
basic axioms of possibility theory. 
Satisfaction and entailment are defined as before ex­
cept that we now consider possibility distributions on 
o.L (instead of 0). 
In [15] it has already been mentioned that both seman­
tics coincide for possibilistic knowledge bases that are 
"consistent." To be more precise, suppose that there is 
a possibilistic distributions 1r on 0 satisfying�- Then 
¢ is entailed by � according to the first semantics if 
and only if ifJ is entailed by � according to the modified, 
inconsistency tolerant, semantics. Of course, both se­
mantics differ in the case where � is inconsistent. Re­
call that ci> given by { (p, N). 7), ( --.p, NJ.4)} entails every 
possibilistic formula according to the first semantics. 
However, according to the inconsistency tolerant se­
mantics we have ci> f= (p, N0.7) and� F {...,p, N0.4), 
but ci> � (p, Na) for a> 0.7 and ci> � (...,p, Na') for 
a'> 0.4. This shows that one can no longer derive any 
possibilistic formula from an inconsistent possibilistic 
knowledge base. 
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A possibilistic knowledge base that is inconsistent ac­
cording to the first semantics is more or less inconsis­
tent according to the inconsistency tolerant semantics. 
For example, { (p, No) , ( •p, No)} should be considered 
more inconsistent than {(p, N/3) , (•p, N/3)} if a> (3. 
To measure the strength of inconsistency the following 
definition has been introduced in [ 15] . 
The inconsistency degree of a possibilistic knowledge 
base�. Incons(�), is defined as follows: 
• If there is a possibility distribution 11" on n.L such 
that 1r f= �and 1r(w) = 1 for some w E 0, then <I> 
is possibly inconsistent and Jncons(<I>) = Ih where 
a =  inf{rr(w.i) lrr F= <I>}. If Jncons(<I>) = no we 
say that � is completely consistent . 
• If for all possibility distributions 1r on n.L, 1r F= � 
implies 1r(w) < 1 for every w E n, � is neces­
sarily inconsistent and Jncons(<I>) = N a where 
0 = inf{1- 1r(w) I wEn and 11" I= <I>}. 
To illustrate this definition let us consider some ex­
amples. To determine the inconsistency degree of 
�1 = {(p, N a) , ( •p, II /3)} we construct an appropri­
ate possibility distribution 11" on n.L satisfying <1>1 . If 
1r I= �1 then 1r(w) � 1 - a for every interpretation 
w with w � p (because N(p) = 1 -sup{1r(w) I w E 
n.L and w � p} � a). First assume that o + (3 � 1. 
We observe that the possibility distribution defined by 
{ 1 if w � •p 
1r(w) = (3 if w�p 
0 if W::;; W.L 
satisfies �1· In fact , N(p) = 1 - sup{1r(w) I w E 
OJ. and w � p} = 1- f3 �a and ll(•p) = sup{rr(w) I 
w E nJ. and w F •p} � /3, which shows that 11" F= <'1>1. 
Thus �1 is completely consistent if o + (3 � 1. 
Now assume that o + f3 > 1. Recall that rr(w) � 1-a 
for every w with w � p, which shows that sup{ 1r(w) I 
w E OJ. and w � p} < (3 (since 1- a < /3). But 
this means that rr(w .L ) � (3 for all 11" satisfying <1>1 
because Il(•p) = max{II'(•p) , rr(w.L)} � /3. Since 
the possibility distribution defined by 
{ 1 if w � •p 
rr(w) = 1 -a if w � p 
(3 if W = W.L, 
satisfies <l>t, we can conclude that <1>1 is possibly incon­
sistent and Incons(�1) = II/3. 
An example for a necessarily inconsistent possibilistic 
knowledge base is <1>2 = { (p, N a) , ( •p, N /3) } where 
a > 0 and (3 > 0. It can easily be checked that 
Incons(<I>2) = Nmin{a,(3}. 
The total ordering on possibility and necessity mea­
sures is defined by ITa � ITa' iff a � a', N a � N a' iff 
a� o' > 0, and No� ITa' iff a> 0 and a'� 1 . 
Thus we have that Incons(<l>) �ITa (resp. Incons(<l>) � 
No) implies Incons(<l>) �ITa' (resp. Incons(<I>) � Na') 
if a > a'. Furthermore, Incons(<I>) � N a implies 
In cons( <I>) � II a1 if a > 0 and a1 � 1 .  This defi­
nition is justified by the fact that if <I> is necessarily 
inconsistent, then rr(w.L) = 1 for all 11" satisfying <1>. 
But this means that 1 = inf { 1r(w .L ) lrr f= <I>} > o for 
any inconsistency degree ITo. 
The following proposition, which has been proved in 
[ 15] , shows that the entailment problem in possibilistic 
logic can be reduced to the problem of determining the 
inconsistency degree of a possibilistic knowledge base, 
and vice versa . 
Proposition 2.1 (Lang, Dubois, and Prade) Let 
<I> be a possibilistic knowledge base. Then: 
• <I> I= (p, ITo) iff Incons(<l> U {(•p , N1)}) �ITa, 
• �I= ( p, No) iff Incons(<l> U {(•p, N1)}) � Na. 
In order to determine (lower bounds for) the inconsis­
tency degree of a possibilistic knowledge base the reso­
lution principle has been extended such that it can be 
applied to possibilistic formulas (see, e.g . ,  [ 15]) . Let 
(c, v) , (c', v' ) be possibilistic formulas, where c,c' are 
first-order formulas in clause form and v, v1 are pos­
sibility or necessity degrees. The possibilistic resolu­
tion rule allows the derivation of a possibilistic formula 
( res(c, c' ), vov') , where res(c, c1) is a classical resolvent 
of c,c', and o is defined as No o No' = Nmin{o, o'}, 
ITo 0 ITo' = no I and 
N 11 ' II , N { no' if o + a
' > 1 
0 0 a = a 0 a = no else 
We notice that if a derived formula has the possibility 
degree no, the formula does not carry any addition­
al information and can therefore be discarded. This 
means in particular that the resolution rule need not 
be applied to two possibility-valued clauses. 
If applications of the rule yield a derivation of an emp­
ty possibilistic clause (D, v) from a set <I> of possibilistic 
clauses, a lower bound for the inconsistency degree of 
<I> is given by v, i.e . ,  Incons(<l>) � v (cf. [15] ) .  
In [15] i t  has been shown that possibilistic resolution 
is sound and complete in the following sense: Let <I> be 
a set of possibility- and necessity-valued propositional 
clauses, or a set of necessity-valued first-order clauses. 
Then Incons( <I>) � v iff there is a derivation of an 
empty possibilistic clause (D, v) from <I> by applications 
of the possibilistic resolution rule. 
Although possibilistic resolution has this nice property, 
the overall calculus, i.e, transforming arbitrary possi­
bilistic formulas into clause form and then applying 
the possibilistic resolution rule, has some drawbacks. 
In the presence of possibility-valued formulas it is in 
general not possible to transform a set of possibilistic 
formulas into a set of possibilistic clauses which have 
the same inconsistency degree ( see [ 15], Section 3.1). 
Also standard resolution may not terminate even if ap­
plied to decidable fragments of first-order logic. This, 
of course, means that possibilistic resolution does in 
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general not yield a decision procedure for a possibilis­
tic extension of terminological logics. 
3 An Alternative Proof Method for 
Possibilistic Logic 
This section describes an alternative method for solv­
ing the entailment problem in possibilistic logic and for 
determining the inconsistency degree of a possibilistic 
knowledge base. The main feature of this method is 
that it completely abstracts from a concrete calculus, 
but uses as basic operation a test for classical entail­
ment. If this test is effective for a given fragment of 
first-order logic, we will see that possibilistic reasoning 
is also decidable for this fragment. 
In the following we assume that the possibility and 
necessity degree of a possibilistic formula is not equal 
to zero. This assumption is justified by the fact that 
by definition IT(p} 2: 0 and N(p} 2: 0 hold, which shows 
that every possibility distribution satisfies formulas of 
the form (p, ITO} or (p, NO}. Hence such formulas do 
not carry any additional information and can therefore 
be discarded from possibilistic knowledge bases. 
Let � be a possibilistic knowledge base and let a E 
[0, 1}. We denote by �" (resp. �") the first-order for­
mulas of necessity-valued formulas in � that have a 
value greater (resp. strictly greater) than a, i.e., 
• �a:= {pI (p, Na') E �. a'� a} and 
• �" :={pI (p, Na') E �. a'> a}. 
These abbreviations are quite useful to give an alterna­
tive characterization of possibilistic entailment. Let � 
be a possibilistic knowledge base, let p be a first-order 
formula, and let 0 < a � 1. We show that 
• � F (p, Na) iff�a f=p 
• � f= (p, ITa) iff 
- �0 f= p or 
- there is some ( q, II [J) E � such that {3 2: a 
and �1-f:l U {q} F p. 
This means that {p, N a) is entailed by � iff the 
first-order formulas of necessity-valued formulas in � 
whose value is not less than a classically entail p. 
For possibility-valued formulas the situation is slight­
ly more complex: (p, II a) is a possibilistic conse­
quence of� iff { 1) the first-order formulas of necessity­
valued formulas in � classically entail p, or (2) there 
is a possibility-valued formula (q, II[J), {J 2: a, in � 
such that q together with the first-order formulas of 
necessity-valued formulas in � whose value is strictly 
greater than 1 - {3 yield a classical proof for p. 
Due to lack of space we omit the soundness and com­
pleteness proof for necessity-valued formulas (see [11]). 
Lemma 3.1 Let � be a possibilistic knowledge base 
and let (p, ITa) be a possibilistic formula with a > 0. 
If �0 f= p or there is some ( q, IJP) E � such that {3 2: a 
and �1-f:l U {q} f= p, then� f= (p, ITa). 
Proof. Assume that �0 f= p holds. There is a 
subset {(p1, Na!), ... ,(pn, N an)} of � such that 
{PI.···,Pn} f= p and min{a t, ... ,an} > 0 .  This 
shows that N (p) > 0. Thus, if 1r is a possibility dis­
tribution satisfying �, we can conclude that for all 
wE !:!1., wit= p implies tr(w) < 1. Because of the 
normalization requirement there is an interpretation 
w' such that tr(w') = 1. Since w1 I= p it follows that 
II(p) = 1, and hence 1r I= (p, ITa). Thus we can con­
clude that <11 F (p, II a). 
Now assume that there is some (q, II {3) E � such 
that {3 2: a and �1-� U {q} I= p. Thus there is 
a subset {(pl, N a1), ... , (Pn, Nan)} of � such that 
{pt, ... ,pn, q} f= pand a;> 1- {3 for all i, 1 $ i � n. 
Let 1r be a possibility distribution on !:!1. such that 
1r F= �. We show that 1r satisfies (p , ITa). Let us recall 
that IT(q) = max{II'(q), tr(wl.)} 2: {3 2: a. 
Case 1: IT(q) = 1r(w1.). Then II(p) = sup{1r(w) I wE 
!:!1. and w F p} 2: tr(wl.) 2: a, which shows that 7r 
satisfies (p, II a) . 
Case 2: II(q) -:j; 1r(w1.). Hence II(q) = II'(q). First we 
show that II'(q /\p1 1\ . . . 1\pn) 2: {3. Observe that 
{3 � II'(q) 
= ll'((q /\p1 1\ ... 1\pn) V (q 1\ -.(pt 1\. · · 1\pn))) 
IT' ( ( q 1\ Pt 1\ ... 1\ Pn) V ( q 1\ ...,Pt) V ... V ( q 1\. ...,Pn)) 
max{II'(q /\p1 1\ ... 1\pn), 
II'(q 1\ -.pi}, .. . , II'(q 1\ -.pn)}, 
and thus it remains to be shown that II'(q 1\ •p;) < {3 
for all i, 1 � i � n. Since N(p;) = N'(p;) 2: a; (which 
follows from the fact that 1r satisfies every (p;, Na;)) we 
have II' ( -.p;) $ 1 -a;. Recall that a; > 1 - {3, which 
shows that II' ( •p;) < {3, and therefore II' ( q 1\ -.p;) < {3 
for i, 1 � i � n. Thus we can conclude that II'{q) = 
II'(q 1\pt 1\ ... 1\pn) 2: {3. Since IT(q /\p1 1\ ... 1\pn) 2: 
II' ( q 1\ Pt 1\ ... 1\ Pn) and {Pt, ... , Pn, q} f= p we know 
that II(p) 2: {3 2: a. Thus 1r satisfies (p, ITa). 0 
Before we prove completeness we need one more defini­
tion and a proposition. Let � be a possibilistic knowl­
edge base only containing necessity-valued formulas. 
The canonical possibility distribution3 tr on f!.t for � 
is defined by tr(w) = 1-max{a I (p, Na) E � and w � 
p}, where max{}:= 0. 
Notice that -rr(w.t ) = 1- max{ a I (p, N a) E � and 
w1. it= p} = 1, which shows that the canonical possibil­
ity distribution satisfies the normalization constraint. 
Proposition 3.2 Let � be a finite set of necessity­
valued formulas and let 1r be the canonical possibility 
distribution for �. Then: 
1. tr(w) � 1-a if(p, Na) E � andw �p. 
2. 1r satisfies �. 
The proof is an immediate consequence of the defini­
tion (cf. [11]). 
3Such a distribution is also called least specific pouibil­
ity distribution in [4]. 
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Lemma 3.3 Let ci> be a possibilistic knowledge base 
and let (p, IIo:) be a possibilistic formula with a > 0. If 
ci> f= (p, ITo:) then cl>0 f= p or there is some (q, llJ1) E ci> 
such that {3 � o: and c�>1-{j U {q} f= p. 
Proof. Assume that ci> f= (p, ITo:) for some a > 0. If 
cl>0 f= p we are done. Thus assume that ct>0 � p. We 
show that there is a formula (q, IT/3) in ci> such that 
{3 �a and c�>l-/3 U {q} f= p. 
Suppose to the contrary that for all ( q, IT/3) in ci> such 
that {3 � a we have 411-13 U { q} Pf: p. In the following 
we construct a possibility distribution 1r1 such that 1r1 
satisfies � U { (...,p, N 1)} and 1r'(w1.) < o:. But this 
means that Incons(<I>U {(-,p, N1)}) < ITa, which shows 
that ci> p6: (p, ITa) (Proposition 2.1), thus contradicting 
the assumption that <I> f= (p, ITo:) holds. 
Let 1r be the canonical possibility distribution for 
{(p', Na') I (p', Na') E <I>} U {(-.p, N1)}. The possi­
bility distribution 1r1 for <I> U { ( -,p, N1)} is constructed 
as follows: 
{ 
1r(w) if w�ct>0U{...,p} 
1r1(w) = lh{o: + 1) if w = Wl. 
1 otherwise, 
where 1 = max{/31 (r, N/3) E <I> and {3 <a}. 
We first show that the normalization constraint is sat­
isfied and that 1r1{w1.) < o:. On the one hand, we 
assumed that <1>0 � p, which means that there is some 
interpretation w1 such that w' f= ct>0 U { --.p}. Hence we 
have 1r1 (w') = 1. On the other hand, we observe that 
1 < a, which means that 1r1(w1.) < o:. 
Next we prove that 1r1 satisfies <I> U {( --,p, N1)}, i.e., we 
show that 11"1 f= q, for every q, E <I> U {( -,p, N 1)}. 
(1.) (p', Na') E <I> U {(...,p, N1)}: 
Then: 
N(p') = 1- sup{1r'{w) I wE fh, w � p'} 
= 1- sup{1r(w) I w E �h, w li= p'} 
� o/, 
which shows that 1r1 f= (p', No:'). 
(2.) (p', ITo:') E <I> where o:' � o:. 
Note that IT(p') = sup{1r'(w) I wE !J:1., w f= p'}, and 
thus it suffices to show that there is some w' E !h 
such that w' f= p1 and 1r'(w') � c/. 
Case 1: There is an interpretation w' different from w l. 
such that w' f= ct>0 U {p', -,p}. Then 1r1(w') = 1 (defini­
tion of 1r1), which shows that IT(p') � 1r1 (w') = 1 � o:'. 
Thus 1r' I== (p', ITo:'). 
Case 2: Now suppose that w � <I>0 U {p', --.p} for every 
interpretation w different from w l. . Recall that we as­
sumed that <I>1-a' U{p'} ji: p. This means that <I>1-a' U 
{p', --.p} is consistent, and hence there is some inter­
pretation w' :f; WJ. such that w' f= c�>l-a' U {p', ...,p}. 
Since we assumed that w p6: <I>0 U {p', --.p} for every in­
terpretation w different from w l., we can conclude that 
there is some (p", N a" ) E ci> such that w' � p11 and 
a"� 1- o:'. 
Since 1r1(w') = 1r(w') (definition of 1r1), it remains to 
be shown that 1r{w') � o:'. In fact, 
1r(w') = 1-max{/31 (r, N/3) E<l> U { (...,p, N1)},w' � r} 
= 1-max{/3 I (r, N/3) E <I> U {(-,p, N1)}, 
{3 � 1 - o:', w' � r} 
> o:' (since {3 � 1 - a'). 
Thus we have shown that TI(p') � 1r'(w') = 1r(w') � a' 
and therefore we can conclude that 1r1 f= (p', II o:'). 
(3.) (p', ITo:') E <I> where o:' < o:. 
Since IT(p') � 1r' (wl. ) it suffices to show that 1r1(w1.) � 
a'. In fact , 1r'(w1.) = lf2(a + 1) � a' (because 1 � o:' 
as well as o: > o:'). 
Thus we have shown that 1r1 satisfies <I> U {(...,p, Nl)}, 
which concludes the proof. 0 
The previous two lemmata together with Lemma 3.1 
and Lemma 3.4 of [11] establish the main result of this 
section . 
Theorem 3.4 Let ci> be a possibilistic knowledge base, 
let p be a first-order formula, and let a > 0. Then 
• <II f= (p, No:) iff<I>a f=p and 
• cl> F (p, ITa) iff 
- <IJO F p or 
- there is some ( q, IT {3) E <I> such that {3 � a 
and <I>1-i3 U { q} f= p. 
Corollary 3.5 Possibilistic entailment is decidable in 
those languages in which classical entailment is decid­
able. 
In the rest of this section we consider the problem of 
how to determine (with the help of Theorem 3.4) the 
inconsistency degree of a possibilistic knowledge base 
cl>. By Proposition 2.1 we know that ci> f= (..i, v) iff 
Incons(cl> U {(...,_1_, Nl)}) � v, and hence ci> f= (..i,v) 
iff Incons( ci>) � v, where ..l is an inconsistent formula 
and v is a necessity or possibility measure. Thus the 
problem is to find the maximal value v such that ci> f= 
(..i, v) . 
Let 1 := min{ a j (p, N a) E <I>}. First assume that 
ct>,. f= ..l. This means that <II is necessarily inconsistent 
at least to degree I· 0 bserve that <I> a 2 <I> a' iff a � o:'. 
Hence, in order to determine the number a E {/3 j 
(p, N {3) E ci>} such that ci> a f= ..l but <I> a li= ..L one can 
for instance apply a binary search algorithm (rather 
than testing for each element a E {a j (p, N a) E <I>} 
whether or not <lla is inconsistent). The inconsistency 
degree of <I> is then given by No:. 
Now assume that <I>,. jb ..l. lf<I>1-Pu{q} is consistent 
for every ( q, II /3) in ci>, we can conclude that <I> is 
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completely consistent (which means that Incons(�) = 
II 0) . Otherwise, the maximal number f3 such that 
(q, II.B) E IJ> and �l-P U {q} is inconsistent yields the 
inconsistency degree of 4>, i .e., Incons(tl>) = TI,B. Note 
that if (q, II/3) and (q', IT,B') are in IJ> where .B::::; {3', 
in general neither Th( { q} U ��>1-P) � Th( { q'} u ��>1-P') 
nor Th({q}Uti>1-P) 2 Th({q'}Uti>1-P') hold. This, 
however, means that one cannot employ binary search 
to determine the required value {3. 
To sum up, assume that 4> is a possibilistic knowledge 
base with n formulas and p is a first-order formula. 
Then one can determine the maximal number a such 
that 4> I= (p, N a) holds with O(log n) classical entail­
ment tests. In contrast to this, one can determine with 
0( n) entailment tests the maximal number a such that 
4> I= (p, ITa) holds. 
4 A Possibilistic Extension of 
Terminological Logics 
This section describes an extension of terminological 
knowledge representation formalisms that handles un­
certain knowledge and allows for approximate reason­
ing. This approach is not only satisfactory from a se­
mantical point of view; it also provides sound and com­
plete decision procedures for the basic inference prob­
lems. These algorithms can immediately be obtained 
by instantiating our proof method with the well-known 
inference algorithms for terminological logics. 
4.1 Terminological knowledge representation 
In the following we briefly introduce a particular ter­
minological formalism, called A.CCN (cf. [13]). Such a 
formalism can be used to define the relevant concepts 
of a problem domain. Relationships between concepts, 
for instance inclusion or disjointness axioms, can be 
expressed in the terminological part. The assertion­
a} part allows one to describe objects of the problem 
domain with respect to their relation to concepts and 
their interrelation with each other . 
We assume two disjoint alphabets of symbols, called 
primitive concepts and roles. The set of concepts is in­
ductively defined as follows. Every primitive concept 
is a concept . Now let C, D be concepts already de­
fined and let R be a role. Then C n D (conjunction), 
C U D (disjunction) ,  -.C (negation), VR.C (value­
restriction), 3R.C (exists-restriction), and (� n R) 
and (::5 n R) (number-restrictions) are concepts of the 
language A.CCN. 
Concepts are usually interpreted as subsets of a do­
main and roles as binary relations over a domain. This 
means that primitive concepts (resp. roles) are consid­
ered as symbols for unary (resp. binary) predicates, 
and that concepts correspond to formulas with one 
free variable. Thus primitive concepts A and roles R 
are translated into atomic formulas A( x) and R( x, y), 
where x, y are free variables. The semantics of the 
concept-forming constructs is given by 
(C n D)(x) := C(x) 1\ D(x), 
(C u D)(x) := C(x) V D(x), 
(-.C)(x) := -.C(x), 
(VR.C)(x) := 'Vy (R(x, y)-+ C(y)), 
(3R.C)(x) := 3y (R(x, y) 1\ C(y)), 
(� n R)(x) := 3yt, ... ,y,. Yt # Y21\Y1 # Yal\ 
· · . I\ Yn-1 # Yn 1\ R(x, y!) 1\ · · . I\ R(x, Yn), 
(::5 n R)(x) := 'Vy1, . .. , y,.+l R(x, yl) 1\ ... 1\ 
R(x,y,.+l)-+ Yt = Y2 Vyt = Ya V . . . Vy,._l = Yn · 
It should be noted that the formulas thus obtained be­
long to a restricted subclass of all first-order formulas 
with one free variable. 
A terminological knowledge base is described by a set 
of inclusion axioms and-to introduce objects with re­
spect to their relation to concepts and their interrela­
tion with each others-a set of membership assertions. 
To be more formal, let C, D be concepts, R be a role, 
and let a ,  b be names for individuals, so-called objects. 
A term inological axiom is of the form C -+ D, and 
expresses that every instance of C is also an instance 
of D. To state that an object a belongs to a concept 
C, or that two objects a, b are related by a role R one 
can use assertions having the form C(a) or R(a, b). 
The semantics of a terminological axiom C -+ D is giv­
en by the formula Vx C(x)-+ D(x), where C(x), D(x) 
are the first-order formulas corresponding to the con­
cepts C, D. To define the semantics of assertions we 
consider individual names as symbols for constants. In 
terminological systems one usually has a unique name 
assumption, which can be expressed by the formulas 
a# b for all distinct individual names a, b. The formu­
la corresponding to the assertion C(a) (resp. R(a, b)) 
is obtained by replacing the free variable(s) in the for­
mula corresponding to C (resp. R) by a (resp. a, b). 
A terminological knowledge base is a pair (T, A) where 
Tis a finite set of terminological axioms (the so-called 
TBox) and A is a finite set of assertions (the so-called 
A Box). Observe that a terminological knowledge base 
(T, A) can be viewed as a finite set of first-order formu­
las that can be obtained by taking the translations of 
the TBox and ABox facts, and the formulas expressing 
unique name assumption. 
The basic inference services for terminological knowl­
edge bases are defined as follows: 
Consistency checking: Does there exist a model for a 
given terminological knowledge base (T, A) ? 
Subsumpt ion problem: Is a terminological axiom C -+ 
D entailed by (T, A), i.e., (T, A) f= \fx C(x) -+ D(x)? 
Instant iat ion problem: Is an assertion C(a) (resp. 
R(a,b)) entailed by (T,A), i.e., (T,A) � C(a) (resp. 
(T,A) f= R(a,b))? 
It should be noted that these inference problems are 
decidable for most terminological logics. 
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4.2 The possibilistic extension 
The possibilistic extension of the terminological for­
malism introduced in the previous subsection is ob­
tained as follows: Each terminological axiom (resp . 
assertion) is equipped with a possibility or a neces­
sity value and will be called possibilistic terminologi­
cal axiom (resp. possibilistic assertion) . A possibilistic 
knowledge base is now a set of possibilistic terminolog­
ical axioms together with a set of possibilistic asser­
tions. 
In order to give some impression on the expressivity of 
the extended terminological language, let us consider 
two examples. The first one, which is taken from [21] , 
is concerned with strict terminological axioms but un­
certain assertions. Assume that 7 is given by 
(father H- man n (;:;:: 1 child ) ,  N1)  
(successfuUather H- father n Vchild .college..grad . ,  N 1 ) ,  
where ( C  H- D ,  N 1 )  is an abbreviation for the axioms 
(C � D, N I )  and (D � C, N 1 ) .  The first axiom 
expresses that someone is a father iff he is a man and 
has some child; the latter one states that someone is a 
successful father iff he is a father and all his children 
are college graduates . 
First consider the (certain) assertions 
A =  { (John : man n (:5 2 child ) ,  N1) , 
( (John, Phi l ip) : chi ld, N1 ) ,  
(Philip : college..grad . ,  N l ) ,  
( (John, Angela) : child , N l) ,  
(Angela : college..grad. ,  N l) } ,  
which state that John is a man having at most two 
children, that Philip and Angela are children of John ,  
and that both are college graduates. Since Phi l ip 
and Angela are the only children of John (because he 
has at most two children) and both children are col­
lege graduates, we can conclude that John is a suc­
cessful father, i .e . ,  the possibilistic assertion (John : 
successfuLfather, N1 )  is entailed by (7, A) .  
Now assume that it  is  only likely that Phi l ip is  a 
college graduate, which can be encoded by (Phi l ip : 
college_grad . ,  N0.8) . Again, by possibilistic entailment 
we conclude that John is a successful father but, of 
course, only with a necessity degree of 0.8. 
In the second example, possibility and necessity de­
grees are utilized to express plausible rules. Assume 
that the TBox 7 contains the following possibilistic 
aXIoms: 
(3owns .porsche � rich_person U car _fanatic, N0.8) 
(rich_person � golfer , TI0.7) .  
The first axiom expresses that it is rather certain that 
someone is either rich or a car fanatic if (s)he owns a 
Porsche. The second one states that rich persons are 
possibly golfers. 
The assertional knowledge is given by the facts that 
Tom owns a Porsche 9 1 1  and that he is probably not 
a car fanatic , i .e . , 
A =  { ((Tom, 9 1 1) : owns, N l),  
(9 1 1 :  porsche , N 1 ) ,  
(Tom : -,car_fanatic, N0.7) } .  
We are interested i n  the question of whether o r  not 
Tom is a golfer. To answer the query observe that 
{(Tom, 911) : Owns, 9 1 1 : porsche }f= Tom : 3owns.porsche, 
which shows that (Tom : 3owns .porsche, N 1) is en­
tailed by l[• A) .  Hence, it can easily be verified that 
(T, A)1-0· U {Tom : rich_person } f= Tom : golfer. This 
shows that (Tom : golfer, TI0.7) is a possibilistic con­
sequence of (/, A) , which means that we have some 
reasons to believe that Tom is a golfer. 
The following proposition shows that possibilistic rea­
soning restricted to the introduced terminological for­
malism is decidable. This result is an immediate con­
sequence of Theorem 3 .4 and the fact that the instanti­
ation problem in A.CCN-knowledge bases is decidable 
(cf. [6, 1] ) .  
Proposition 4 . 1  Let T be a finite set of possibilistic 
axioms and let A be a finite set of possibilistic asser­
tions. It is decidable whether or not a possibilistic ax­
iom (resp. possibilistic assertion) is entailed by (T, A) . 
Almost all terminological systems do not allow arbi­
trary TBoxes, but only those that satisfy certain con­
ditions (for instance, the left hand side of an axiom 
must be a primitive concept , and a primitive concept 
may appear at most once at the left hand side of an 
axiom) . In [12 ,  Chapter 7 .3] it has been shown how to 
obtain more efficient inference procedures if possibilis­
tic TBoxes satisfy the additional restrictions. 
5 Conclusion 
We have developed an alternative proof method for 
possibilistic logic which exploits the fact that possi­
bilistic reasoning can be reduced to reasoning in clas­
sical, i .e. first-order, logic. Consequently, possibilistic 
reasoning is decidable for a fragment of first-order logic 
iff classical entailment is decidable for it. Moreover, if 
one has an algorithm solving the entailment problem, 
our method automatically yields an algorithm realizing 
possibilistic entailment which is sound and complete 
with respect to the semantics for possibilistic logic. 
Furthermore, we have instantiated possibilistic logic 
with a terminological logic, which is a decidable frag­
ment of first-order logic, but nevertheless much more 
expressive than propositional logic. This leads to an 
extension of terminological logics towards the repre­
sentation of uncertain knowledge which is-in con­
trast to other approaches-satisfactory from a seman­
tic point of view. Moreover, a sound and complete 
algorithm for possibilistic entailment in such an ex­
tension can be obtained by using inference procedures 
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which have already been developed for terminological 
logics. 
An interesting point for further research is to employ 
possibilistic logic in order to represent and reason with 
defaults in terminological formalisms. In fact, in [9 , 4] 
it has been argued that possibilistic logic yields a good 
basis for nonmonotonic reasoning. Roughly speaking, 
the idea is as follows: If the necessity of a formula 
p is greater than the necessity of -.p with respect to 
a set � of necessity-valued formulas, then infer non­
monotonically p from �- This intuitive definition in 
fact characterizes an appropriate nonmonotonic con­
sequence relation as (1)  the operator can be described 
in terms of preferential models, and (2) most of the 
axioms which a nonmonotonic operator should satis­
fy are met (see [9] on these points) .  The approach 
presented in [4) , however, uses propositional logic and 
cannot directly be applied to the terminological case. 
One reason for this is that terminological default rules 
usually allow one to state that "C's are normally D's" 
where C, D are concepts, i .e. , first-order formulas with 
one free variable. 
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